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RESUMO ABSTRACT 
O presente trabalho visa trazer à baila a pesquisa sobre o 
tema da fidelidade partidária, sob o enfoque do exercício 
dos parlamentares de seu voto no processo de 
impeachment. Primeiramente analisaremos o instituto da 
fidelidade partidária, sob o enfoque de seu tratamento no 
ordenamento jurídico pátrio. Além disso, iremos estudar o 
que seria o “fechamento de questão” e como ele 
funcionaria – de forma genérica – nos partidos brasileiros. 
Ainda iremos estudar o processo de impeachment e a 
atuação dos parlamentares (Deputados e Senadores) e sua 
função dentro da teoria de checks and balances, no referido 
procedimento. Por fim, traremos um estudo de caso 
referente ao “fechamento de questão” pelo Partido 
Democrático Trabalhista – PDT, no processo de 
impeachment da ex-presidente Dilma Rousseff. Para 
atingimento dos objetivos científicos traçados, 
procederemos a uma abordagem de estudo qualitativa do 
tipo exploratória, tendo como base o levantamento 
bibliográfico da literatura jurídica a fim de melhor 
compreender os institutos jurídicos envolvidos e efetivar a 
contraposição dos posicionamentos existentes na 
atualidade sobre os temas acima descritos, almejando 
compreender qual o melhor posicionamento acerca dos 
temas por meio do desenvolvimento argumentativo das 
teorias atuais.  
 
The present work aims to shed light to the research on the 
theme of party loyalty, under the focus on the exercise of 
the parliamentarians’ vote during the process of 
impeachment. First, we will analyze the institution of party 
loyalty, under the focus of its treatment on the country’s 
legal order. In addition, we will study what would be the 
"fixation of matter" and how it would function – in a 
generic way – inside Brazilian political parties. We will 
then study the process of impeachment and the 
performance of parliamentarians (Deputies and Senators) 
and their function within the theory of checks and balances, 
in the previously mentioned procedure. Finally, we will 
bring a case study on the "fixation of matter" by the 
Democratic Labor Party - PDT, during the impeachment 
process of former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. In 
order to reach the scientific objectives outlined above, we 
will proceed to an exploratory qualitative study based on a 
bibliographical legal literature research in order to better 
understand the legal institutions involved in it as well as 
turning effective the counter parts of already existing 
positions on the topics described above, intending to 
understand the best positioning on the themes through the 
argumentative development of current theories. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The impeachment process occurs 
whenever there is suspicion that the Chief of 
Executive has committed a crime. As dealing with 
the calculation of the responsibility crime, the 
parliamentarians occupy a featured position, as 
they are delegated to the same reckoning and 
judgement as the Chief of Executive. In that way, 
parliamentarians – Deputies and Senators – are 
put in the position of judges, executing a typical 
function of Judicial Power and therefore acting in 
an atypical manner as members of the Legislative 
Power1. 
The study of the attitude of these 
parliamentarian members becomes then relevant 
as the development of the impeachment process 
occurs, especially as concerning their 
subordination to their related parties, once that in 
our [Brazilian] representative democracy, the 
party membership is mandatory to the exercise of 
the mandate. 
There are several questions to be made 
thenceforth. Firstly, the possibility of a party to 
shape the way its members should vote during the 
impeachment process is questioned. Secondly, 
there should be an imperious analysis if, in being 
in a certain way, the parliamentarians are being 
determined to act that way only associated to that 
party’s commandment. Developing that 
investigation, in the case of noncompliance to that 
party premises, could there be punishment 
because of party betrayal? Finally, can the 
parliamentarian have its mandate revoked by the 
                                                             
1 For a better understanding of judicial terms issued at hand one should study the Brazilian political system. (Translator’s 
note) 
2 Partido Democrático Trabalhista. 
party for not having obeyed a fixed guideline as 
voting during the impeachment process? 
All these questions are extremely 
important, since depending on the responses 
found, we should have the possibility of a 
parliamentarian elected by direct means, i.e., 
through the popular vote, to lose his mandate 
because of a counter positioning to the bounded 
party. That is one of the reasons why that subject 
deserves to have its studies deepened. 
 
1 CASE STUDY 
 
In a brief study about the impeachment 
process of former President Dilma Rousseff in the 
Brazilian parliament, we will evaluate the 
application and practical consequences of the 
topic proposed for the debate.  
In chronological order: in December 
2015, the then President of the Deputies 
Assembly – Eduardo Cunha – received the 
accusation against the President Dilma Rousseff, 
with the final judgement by the Senate, by its turn 
under the presidency of the then President of the 
Federal Supreme Court, Ricardo Lewandoswki. 
In front of the opening of the referred 
process, several parties – from the base or 
opposition – started to deliberate, some of them 
“fixating the matter” under what should be the 
adopted position of their member congressmen 
during the judgement of the presidential 
impeachment. 
One of those parties was the PDT 2  – 
Democratic Labor Party –, party that compounded 
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01/22/2016 gathered the National Directory3  of 
the referred party, which has decided to “fix the 
matter”, meaning the positioning against the 
President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment.  
Adding the concerned decision, in the 
eminence of voting by the Chamber of Deputies 
(occurred in 04/17/2016), in 04/15/2016 the 
National Executive from PDT has gathered, 
aiming to institute penalties to the 
parliamentarians that wouldn’t obey the “fixation 
of matter” put by the Directory in January, as it 
can be read in its minute: 
 
[...] The President Carlos Lupi did brief analysis 
of the political conjuncture of the country, 
especially about the impeachment process of the 
President Dilma Rousseff, alerting about the 
approved proposal by unanimity of the members 
of the National Executive and addressed for 
approval by the National Directory of PDT on 
January, the 22th of this year, which also ratified, 
in an unanimous manner, the indicative of 
National Executive by the contrary vote for the 
President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment. [...] 
The president determined the prompt installation 
of the National Ethic Commission, in order to 
analyze processes of expulsion with the 
devolution of their respective mandates of all 
the parliamentarians that vote against the 
determination of the National Directory of 
PDT, observing the due process and warrantee of 
broad defense right to the accused, following 
what is determined by the party Statute in its 
articles 10, 14, 61, 62, 63 and 68, and in their 
corresponding paragraphs, that foresee the loss 
of parliamentarian mandate, in addition to 
immediate intervention of State Direction, in the 
                                                             
3 Diretório Nacional. 
4 DEMOCRATIC WORK PARTY. Minutes of the Meeting 
of the National Executive with the national ethics 
committee held at the national headquarters of the PDT. 1st 
Registration Office for Legal Entities. Brasilia DF. Number 
00133105 and 00133106 from book number A-06 on 
04/19/2016.  
From the original: “[...] O Presidente Carlos Lupi fez breve 
análise da conjuntura política do país, especialmente sobre 
o processo de impeachment da Presidenta Dilma Rousseff, 
alertando sobre a proposta aprovada pela unanimidade dos 
membros da Executiva Nacional e encaminhada para 
aprovação do Diretório Nacional do PDT no dia vinte e dois 
de janeiro deste ano, que ratificou, também de forma 
unânime, o indicativo da Executiva Nacional pelo voto 
contrário ao impeachment da Presidenta Dilma 
cases in which the parliamentarian exercises the 
presidency. [...] (we marked)4 
 
Well, in the nominative day for voting on 
the impeachment process at the Chamber, from 
the original 19 members of the bench of the 
referred party, six deputies voted in favor of 
impeachment, going against the mentioned party 
determination.  
Against this fact, a disciplinary process 
has been opened against this six deputies and, in 
the end of this process, the National Directory has 
decided for applying the following punishments: 
expulsion of Giovani Cherini (RS) and 
suspension for 40 days to other five deputies: 
Sérgio Vidigal (ES), Flávia Morais (GO), Mário 
Heringer (MG), Subtenente Gonzaga (MG) and 
Hissa Abrahão (AM). Flávia Morais and Vidigal 
have also been pulled away from the command of 
the state directories from Goiás and Espírito 
Santo5. 
This case shows us clearly how all the 
study we seek to develop materializes, and how 
serious its consequences can be. A deputy was 
effectively expelled from the party for which he 
was elected, because this party took a side in the 
process of impeachment and thereby sought to 
compel its members to follow this determination 
through the “Fixation of Matter”. questions 
remain: and their constituents? And the vows he 
represented there? And what use has the party 
Rousseff. [...] O presidente determinou a imediata 
instalação da Comissão de Ética Nacional, a fim de analisar 
processos de expulsão com a devolução dos respectivos 
mandatos de todos os parlamentares que votarem contra 
a determinação do Diretório Nacional do PDT, 
observando o devido processo legal e garantida ampla 
defesa ao acusado, seguindo o que determina o Estatuto 
partidário em seus artigos 10, 14, 61, 62, 63 e 68, e, seus 
parágrafos correspondentes, que prevêem a perda do 
mandato parlamentar, além de imediata intervenção na 
Direção Estadual, nos casos em que o parlamentar exercer a 
presidência. [...] (destacamos)”. 
5 Abbreviations for the names of Brazilian states: RS (Rio 
Grande do Sul), MG (Minas Gerais), GO (Goiás), ES 
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made of his chair up to that point? Is non-
compliance with a "closed question" by the party 
a reason for expulsion? Can, in the process of 
impeachment, the party compel the 
parliamentarian to decide in advance, one side? 
They are not easy debates but we will try 
to answer some of these questions in the present 
work. 
 
2 COALITION PRESIDENTIALISM 
 
In Brazil we live the so called “coalition 
presidentialism”, a term coined by Sérgio 
Henrique Abranches in 1988, during the 
Constituent Assembly 6 . One must begin by 
analysing the presidentialist form of government 
stressing that between parliamentarianism and 
presidentialism, the later was always preferred in 
relation to the previous every time Brazilian’s 
public opinion has been requested7. 
In parliamentarianism, there is a 
tendency to homogeneity between the Executive 
and Legislative Powers, once the nomination of 
the Prime Minister is decided inside the 
Parliament, it is, in a straight trustworthy 
relationship between these powers. In that way it 
is hoped that, in Parliamentarianism, the 
Legislative defines the Prime Minister through a 
process that leads to a “relatively steady political 
commitment” 8 , in which the governability is 
presupposed by the own process of choosing of 
Chief of Executive. 
Differently, in Presidentialism, both the 
Parliament and the Chief of Executive are elected 
                                                             
6  ABRANCHES, Sérgio Henrique Hudson de. 
Presidencialismo de coalizão: o dilema institucional 
brasileiro. Dados – revista de Ciências Sociais. Rio de 
Janeiro, v.31, n.1, p.5-34, 1988. 
7  KORNIS, Mônica Almeida. Parlamentarismo, sim ou 




8 SANTOS, Fabiano. Escolhas institucionais e transição por 
transação: sistemas políticos de Brasil e Espanha em 
by the people, making possible that the political 
position of the Chief of Executive to be diverse of 
the majority of the Parliament, once they are 
automatically elected. 
Then, one might ask oneself: what about 
the coalition, its sense and necessity in Brazilian 
political context? After Paulo Ricardo Scheier, for 
a better understanding of this question, we should 
divide this approach in two main assumptions: the 
first, historical-sociological, denotes that Brazil is 
an uneven country, with a heterogeneous and 
plural formation, with continental dimensions and 
regional and completely diverse demands; and a 
second one – with institutional analysis – 
evaluating the existing conjunction of 
presidentialism, multi-party system, federalism 
and electoral system of open list9. 
Bearing in mind the juncture of all the 
above mentioned factors, it is necessary to make 
a macro analysis of Brazil’s governance 
framework and also its division into instituted 
powers. The first of the two relates to the fact that, 
in the parliamentarian elections “even though the 
plead is realized simultaneously in all country, the 
calculation of votes and the electoral basis are 
local” 10 , making that the parliamentarians – 
Deputies and Senators – have their electoral basis 
regionalized and, therefore, the demands they lead 
to the National Congress are those with a more 
local specific range of interests.  
Aligned to that, Brazil exerts a multi-
party system11 and a proportional system of open 
list, in which the electors vote in the person of the 
candidate (and not in a specific party, which has 
perspectiva comparada. Dados. Rio de Janeiro, v. 23, n.04, 
2000. 
9 SCHIER, Paulo Ricardo. Presidencialismo de coalizão: 
contexto, formação e elementos na democracia brasileira. 
Curitiba: Juruá, 2017. P. 71. 
10 Idem, p.99. In Portuguese: “embora o pleito seja realizado 
simultaneamente em todo país, o cômputo dos votos e a base 
eleitoral são locais.” (Translator’s Note) 
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its closed list of candidates) and have their votes 
counted to constitute the party coefficient that 
shall determine the number of seats of each party 
in Parliament 12 . One must realize that this 
junction of factors creates a scenario, in which the 
plurality of regional interests has a higher 
probability of being represented in Parliament, 
what brings as a consequence the fragmentation 
of the parliamentarian representation13. 
In short, the scenario that is shown is: a 
multi-party system parliament, with 
representatives of more than 20 different parties14, 
heterogeneous and plural that, seen from inside 
the electoral process, seeks to comply with its 
regional interests (its electoral basis), without a 
significant commitment with national agendas 
while, conversely, the Executive is elected 
directly from the people of the entire country, 
requiring for its turn the observance to (all) 
national agendas and that hasn’t, necessarily, 
identification of its administration plans with 
those of the majority of Parliament, once the 
elections to both are direct and autonomous.  
All things considered, the exercise of the 
government by the President must pass through 
                                                             
12  CORDEIRO, Rodrigo Aiache. Sistemas partidários e 
sistemas eleitorais. Disponível em: <httm://www.ambito-
jurídico.com.br/site/índex.phpn_link=revista_artigos_leitur
a&arigo_id=6357>. Acesso em: 10/05/18. 
13  MAINWARING, Scott. Democracia Presidencialista 
multipartidária: o caso do Brasil. Lua Nova. São Paulo, n. 
28-29, p. 21-74, abr. 1993. Disponível em: 
<http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S
0102-64451993000100003&Ing=en=en&nrm=iso >. 
Acesso em: 10/05/2018. 
14  Disponível em: 
<http://www2.camara.leg.br/deputados/pesquisa/bancadas/
bancada-atual> Acesso em: 08/05/2018. 
15  After the submission of the budget by the Executive 
Power to the National Congress there is a possibility of 
production of amendments by Parliamentarians to that 
budget – individual or collectively – through which one 
seeks to present specific investments to one’s electoral base 
region, aiming the safeguard of one’s good relationship with 
the respective electorate, as well as the accomplishment of 
his political campaign promises. 
16 VICTOR, Sérgio Antônio Ferreira. Presidencialismo de 
coalizão: exame do atual sistema de governo brasileiro. 
São Paulo: Saraiva, 2015. p. 121-123: The author stresses 
negotiation of its interest’s agendas and approval 
by the Parliament. What one glimpses is an 
exchange of interests – almost always using the 
parliamentarian amendments as bargaining 
chips15. 
 Once the budget is limited (finit), there 
is no way to negotiate every agenda individually 
with all Deputies and Senators straightly trading 
approval from each’s amendments; hence 
promoting the need to form a support basis for the 
ruling administration, using as a currency trade – 
in the most part of the time – the designations to 
important positions and functions in the 
Government16, providing the loyal (to the base) 
parties with visibility and influence. As Limongi 
e Figueiredo stresses: 
 
[...] the distribution of rights and resources is 
extremely favorable to the party leaders. The 
President of the Chamber and the party leaders 
exert a rigid control upon the legislative process. 
They are responsible for the determination of the 
legislative agenda. [...] Besides that, the leaders 
have the right to represent the benches of the 
parties: they can sign petitions in the name of 
every member of the party benches to approval 
of several procedures inside the Legislative 
Power.17 
that the process of formation of the Cabinet of Ministers is 
one of the most crucial moments for the coalition 
presidentialism, once its distribution has the role of 
bargaining votes of every Congressmen from the 
Parliamentarian’s party. Therefore, it follows the logic of 
giving the best ministries to the leaders of the most 
represented parties. 
17  LIMONGI, Fernando; FIGUEIREDO, Argelina. 
Instituições políticas e governabilidade: desempenho do 
governo e apoio legislativo na democracia brasileira. In: 
RANULFO, Carlos (org). A Democracia Brasileira: 
Balanço e Perspectivas para o Século 21. Belo Horizonte: 
Editora da UFMG, 2007. P. 25-32. From the original: “a 
distribuição de direitos e recursos parlamentares é 
extremamente favorável aos líderes partidários. O 
presidente da Câmara e os líderes partidários exercem um 
controle rígido sobre o processo legislativo. Eles são 
responsáveis pela determinação da pauta legislativa. [...] 
Além disso os líderes têm o direito de representar as 
bancadas dos partidos: eles podem assinar petições em 
nome de todos os membros das bancadas partidárias para a 
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This is the Coalition Presidentialism, in 
which the Chief of Executive has, in order to have 
governability, to form a support basis in 
Parliament, so he can articulate governmental 
agendas and get approval for his projects. 
Nevertheless, as Paulo Ricardo Schier 
puts: 
 
The functioning of this coalition model demands 
a party discipline. If the political party and the 
leaderships take on the commitment to compose 
the coalition, it shall then exist an institutional 
guarantee that assures a minimum loyalty. And 
in that matter the institutional arrangement once 
more acts as a warrantor from coalitions. The 
Brazilian Legislation visits the party infidelity 
with the affiliation, what, as a consequence, 
means the mandate’s loss, once the 
parliamentarian seat belongs to the parties and 
not to the candidates themselves.18 
 
At this point we meet the theme studied 
in the present work. The coalition presidentialism 
demands, for its success, that the Parliamentarians 
of the governmental basis vote in accordance with 
the governmental agendas; and, among the 
instruments utilized for that we find the “fixation 
of matter”. Once again, it is the practice through 
which the party determines by means of a 
(previous) meeting the way their Deputies and 
Senators must vote, under the penalty of being 
punished under accusation of party infidelity and, 
in last instance, also susceptible of being expelled 
from their parties as a charge for noncompliance 
on the fixation of matter. 
The questions that returns now is 
whether, in the specific case of the vote of the 
Parliamentarians during the impeachment 
process, these votes should be attached to a 
possible “fixation of matter” determined by the 
                                                             
18 SCHIER, Paulo Ricardo. Presidencialismo de coalizão: 
contexto, formação e elementos na democracia brasileira. 
Curitiba: Juruá, 2017. p. 116. From the original in 
Portuguese: “O funcionamento desse modelo de coalizão 
demanda disciplina partidária. Se o partido político e as 
lideranças assumem o compromisso de integrar a coalizão, 
party before the trial takes place on Parliament 
and, in case of noncompliance to the party rule, if 
there should be a punishment against those who 
voted misaligned to the party. 
 
3 PARTY LOYALTY 
 
3.1 The Party Loyalty 
 
The [Brazilian] word for Loyalty or 
Fidelity, fidelidade, is one of those words that 
carries an affective meaning in a bigger or lesser 
degree, depending on the interlocutor, at  the same 
time that it brings the desire of respect, loyalty and 
righteousness. In that way, to determine if a 
subject is worth of faith – faith(full) – in relation 
to whatever it is, there shall be a careful analysis, 
once the conclusion to the (in)fidelity will always 
bring effects (either positive or negative) into the 
World. 
That being said, we go from the 
assumption that, in Brazil, there is an electoral 
system formed by a proportional representation 
exercised by an open list. That is, despite of a 
mandatory membership from the candidate to a 
political party to concur in an election, the voters 
will vote directly in its candidate (and not in a 
closed college list). In that way, even knowing 
that there is the party’s quotient and that the seats 
are distributed accordingly to the proportion 
obtained by the sum of votes of the candidates of 
the party – we are not aiming to unravel the 
complex Brazilian electoral system here –, it is 
important to say that the open list system not only 
gives incentives to the candidate’s autonomy, but 
that it also makes one bonded to one’s electoral 
basis, in a much robust way than to one’s own 
party – in a greater amount. 
deve então existir uma garantia institucional que assegure o 
mínimo de fidelidade. E neste quesito o arranjo institucional 
mais uma vez atua como fiador das coalizões. A legislação 
brasileira pune a infidelidade partidária com a desfiliação o 
que, por consequência, significa perda do mandato, já que a 
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With that on mind, according to the 
hierarchical order of the Juridical System, we 
shall begin the analysis of the institution of Party 
Loyalty by studying what is disposed on the 
Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 19 
(henceforth BFC/88) on the matter. In that way it 
was determined under the text of Article 17, 1st 
paragraph that the political parties are free to 
establish in its regular statutes disciplinary and 
loyalty norms.  
Starting with the analysis of the Magna 
Carta, it is important to emphasize that there is no 
definition, contour or specification of what would 
be the so called party loyalty and, unlike the 
previous Brazilian Constitution (Article 152 of 
the Constitutional Amendment of 1969)20, there is 
no prediction of mandate loss in function of party 
betrayal in the current Constitution. 
 In that way, we begin analyzing the 
infraconstitutional laws on the matter, more 
specifically the Law 9.096/95 – The Law of 
Political Parties – that disposes about party 
loyalty: 
  
Art. 23. The responsibility for party duty 
violation should be accurate and punished by the 
competent authority, in conformity to what has 
been disposed by each party’s statute. 
§ 1º Memberships muss not suffer disciplinary 
measure or punishment for a conduct that has not 
been typified by the political party statute.  
                                                             
19  BRAZIL. Federal Constitution (1988). Constitution of 
the Federative Republic of Brazil. Brasília: Senado, 1988. 
Disponível em: 
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constit
uicaocompilado.htm>. Acesso em: 19/05/2017. 
20 BRAZIL. Constitutional Amendment No. 1, of October 
17, 1969. Official Journal. Brasília. Disponível em: 
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/Emen
das/Emc_anterior1988/emc01-69.htm> Acesso em: 
20/09/2017. 
21  From the original: “Art. 23. A responsabilidade por 
violação dos deveres partidários deve ser apurada e punida 
pelo competente órgão, na conformidade do que disponha o 
estatuto de cada partido. 
§ 1º Filiado algum pode sofrer medida disciplinar ou 
punição por conduta que não esteja tipificada no estatuto do 
partido político. 
§ 2º Ao acusado é assegurado amplo direito de defesa. 
§ 2º To the accused is assured broad right of 
defense. 
Art. 24. At the Legislative House, the member of 
each party’s bench must subordinate its 
parliamentarian act to the doctrinal and 
programmatic principles and to the party’s 
established guidelines in the statute’s form. 
Art. 25. The party’s statute should establish 
beyond the basic disciplinary party measures, 
norms about penalties, including those with 
temporary disconnection of the bench, 
suspension of the vote in internal meetings or 
loss of all its prerogatives, place and functions 
that it exerts in consequence of its representation 
and party proportion, in the respective 
Legislative House, to the parliamentarian that 
opposes, by attitude or vote, to the legitimate 
established party authority’s guidelines.  
Art. 26. One loses automatically one’s function 
or place exerted in the respective Legislative 
House in virtue of the party proportion, if the 
parliamentarian leaves the party by which it may 
have been elected.21 
 
As one can notice, the previously 
mentioned norm directs the details about the party 
loyalty rules to each political party’s statutes. 
Therefore, if we want to know what each party 
understands by party loyalty, it is necessary to 
analyze casuistically each of the founding party’s 
Law for delimitating its contours – what escapes 
from the proposal of the present study. We aim, 
yes, to discuss the contours of the party loyalty in 
a lato sense, without the need to particularize 
what every Brazilian party (second Superior 
Art. 24. Na Casa Legislativa, o integrante da bancada de 
partido deve subordinar sua ação parlamentar aos princípios 
doutrinários e programáticos e às diretrizes estabelecidas 
pelos órgãos de direção partidários, na forma do estatuto. 
Art. 25. O estatuto do partido poderá estabelecer, além das 
medidas disciplinares básicas de caráter partidário, normas 
sobre penalidades, inclusive com desligamento temporário 
da bancada, suspensão do direito de voto nas reuniões 
internas ou perda de todas as prerrogativas, cargos e funções 
que exerça em decorrência da representação e da proporção 
partidária, na respectiva Casa Legislativa, ao parlamentar 
que se opuser, pela atitude ou pelo voto, às diretrizes 
legitimamente estabelecidas pelos órgãos partidários. 
Art. 26. Perde automaticamente a função ou cargo que 
exerça, na respectiva Casa Legislativa, em virtude da 
proporção partidária, o parlamentar que deixar o partido sob 
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Electoral Court, are currently 35 22 ) would 
understand by party betrayal and its respective 
penalties. 
The party loyalty institution has as a first 
goal to bind the parliamentarian act to the party 
ticket program23 to which it has been affiliated, 
objecting cohesion between its members in what 
concerns to questions connected to the guidelines 
set by the party’ statute.  
The existence of a party loyalty norm is 
necessary to bring this cohesion to the parties, 
because it avoids that each elected politician starts 
to act solo, disrespecting their guidelines, what 
would make them to lose their indispensability, 
and what would consequently cause a 
democracy’s ideological deterioration, in such a 
way that we would only have individuals without 
the binding to any “ensigns”, acting aimlessly or 
without a basis of beliefs to support them. In that 
manner, party loyalty is what, in fact, makes 
possible the connection between the party and the 
elector, whereas the conducting wire is the elected 
parliamentarian.  
Notwithstanding its [extreme] need to 
the development of the representative democracy, 
party loyalty can’t suppress the parliamentarian 
itself, as Professor Clève well put it: 
 
One cannot tolerate the institution’s 
denaturalization, as to allow the emergency of a 
party dictatorship or the dominance of political 
oligopoly. Nor can, in addition, transform the 
parliamentarian in a mere automaton, as an 
unwilling mouth, destined only to express, 
violating the consciousness and the liberty of 
                                                             
22  BRAZIL. Superior Electoral Court. Disponível em: 
<http://www.tse.jus.br/partidos-politicos/registrados-no-
tse.> Acesso em: 04 de maio de 2018. 
23 Programa de legenda partidária. 
24  CLÈVE, Clèmerson Merlin. Fidelidade Partidária e 
Impeachment – Estudo de Caso. 2. ed. Curitiba: Juruá 
Editora, 2012, p. 28.  
From the original: “Não se pode tolerar a desnaturação do 
instituto, de tal modo a permitir a emergência de ditadura 
partidária ou do domínio dos oligopólios políticos. Nem 
pode, ademais, transformar o parlamentar em mero 
autômato, em boca sem vontade, destinado apenas a 
expressar, violentando a consciência e a liberdade de 
conviction, any deliberation taken by a party 
authority, not always democratically constituted 
and, in furthermore, by mandate’s headlines 
conferred by the electorate itself. 
[...] In that case, as Marcel Waline stresses, it 
would be the “equivalent to say that each party 
constitutes a state inside the state. It could 
suppress the parliamentarian and give to each 
party a corresponding coefficient to the 
percentage of its vote in the country.24 
 
The constitutionalist starts shedding 
light on the theme as clarifying that the party 
loyalty cannot be taken to the point to transform 
the parliamentarian into mere “party’s mouth” – 
as the Judge is not (or it should not be) the bouche 
de la loi, as put by Montesquieu25  –, removing 
the most fundamental rights of the Republic like 
the liberty of consciousness, belief, philosophical 
and political believes.  
Well, any ordinary citizen has the above 
portrayed rights assured, so one cannot expect less 
from those that have been elected exactly to 
represent them. It would be an enormous 
contradiction to elect representatives that had 
their rights to express taken from them precisely 
from their political parties. 
As one can verify, the line in which the 
party loyalty stands is thin and fickle, and should 
it hang too much for the parliamentarian’s 
liberality side – in relation to their parties –, we 
would certainly be in front of the debauchery from 
the primordial ideology of parties; or in the other 
case, the line could incline too much for the 
obligatoriness of the parliamentarians to vote in a 
recurrent and same way, and one would notice the 
convicção, qualquer deliberação tomada por órgão 
partidário, nem sempre constituído democraticamente e, 
ademais, por titulares de mandatos conferidos pelo 
eleitorado. [...] Neste caso, como salienta Marcel Waline, 
seria o “equivalente a dizer que cada partido constitui um 
estado dentro do estado. Poder-se-ia suprimir o parlamento 
e atribuir a cada partido um coeficiente correspondente à 
percentagem de seus votos no país”.” 
25 MONTESQUIEU, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de 
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denaturalization of the representative democracy, 
once the voted candidate would not express his 
position – and from the parcel of the population 
that saw in him their representative – only 
repeating what has been ordered from them by the 
party, which would be then the State of Parties 
(the Parteienstaat to the Germans or  the 
partitocrazia to Italians). 
In that sense, the balance on the use of 
the party loyalty is imperious, under the penalty 
of transforming the “people’s representative” into 
the “party’s representative”,  fitting here the small 
addendum in the sense that the national 
executives, the management and other bodies of 
the political parties, i.e., those that define what 
would be treated as a voting mandatory theme by 
the parliamentarians through the party loyalty 
would not be elected democratically, being 
formed internally by the party without any 
popular participation. 
 
3.2 Operation of the “Fixation of Matter” 
 
The institution of party loyalty is 
necessary – as glimpsed above – and the 
instrument used by the political party to attach its 
parliamentarians, in the cases in which there is 
desire to direct their votes in a specific manner, is 
the “fixation of matter”. In other words, when the 
political party (in the foreseen way in its Statute – 
be it via General Assembly, National Executive, 
Ethics Council, etc.) determines that all their 
congressmen must place themselves in unison 
about a certain matter that will be debated in 
Parliament.  
Therefore, at the moment in which there 
is the “fixation of matter” the party puts the thesis 
to be followed, subjecting to those that fail the 
                                                             
26 BASTOS, Celso Ribeiro de. Comentários à Constituição 
do Brasil. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1988, p. 614.  
From the original: “No entanto, o fechamento da questão, 
em torno de determinados pontos, pela fixação de diretrizes, 
a serem compulsoriamente cumpridos, deve ser utilizada 
com muita moderação, é dizer, somente naqueles casos em 
referred order to the penalties provided by the 
Code of Ethics and by the Statute – mostly there 
is prevision of the party’s expulsion and mandate 
loss (among the surveyed). 
Nevertheless, that is a matter that shall be 
treated with precaution, as we did to the party 
loyalty. The use of the instrument of the “fixation 
of matter”, as well said by Bastos: 
 
However, the fixation of the matter, surrounding 
determined points, as fixing guidelines to be 
compulsorily accomplished, must be used with 
moderation, that is to say, only in those cases in 
which there is discussion about the frequent 
programmatic ideas, obviously, the instrument of 
foundation of the party, as well as the full public 
knowledge. (…) The use of this institution 
brings, thus, frequently the serious menace of an 
internal dictatorship of the party.26 
 
That is, the party should only use the 
studied instrument in the moments in which there 
has been in debate norms capable of affecting the 
basis and founding guidelines of it, what makes 
every sense, since the elector, besides choosing its 
candidate, believes in the ideological base to 
which one has been affiliated and, in case that the 
parliamentarian should vote in discordance to the 
referred norm, one would clearly be breaking the 
trust bond firmed between the elector and the 
political party. As an example, if a party has as its 
first base the defense of workers, it makes 
plausible the “fixation of matter” firming an 
opposed position to a project or law enforcement 
to be voted that would limit worker’s rights. 
However, as well put by Bastos27 , the 
fixation of matter shouldn’t be used in an 
indiscriminate form, forcing the parliamentarians 
through the use of the norm’s coercivity (which 
foresees penalties) to positioning in matters that 
haven’t been correlated to the party’s guidelines 
que estejam em discussão idéias programáticas constantes, 
obviamente, dos instrumentos de fundação do partido, mas 
também como de pleno conhecimento público. [...] A 
utilização, portanto, frequente desse instituto traz consigo a 
séria ameaça de uma ditadura interna no partido.” 
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or in issues eminently programmatic, constant in 
the Statute and party’s founding norms, and of 
complete public knowledge. 
The determinations poured by the 
themes originating from the “fixation of matter” 
cannot aspire to transform the nature of the 
mandate, since the representative mandate cannot 
be mistaken for the imperative mandate (in which 
the representative was obliged to repeat the 
determination of its electors under penalty of 
destitution), transforming it in a party 
imperativeness.  
In so being, the institution of party 
loyalty, by restricting the full exercise of the 
political representation, and for affronting the 
liberty of consciousness of the parliamentarian, 
which has a ground in an Eternity Clause, can 
only be used when its need cannot be argued, only 
aiming the maintenance of the party guidelines. 
In the year of 1984, looking for 
inspiration in the oral opinion of the General 
Electoral Prosecutor, along by the Supreme 
Electoral Court28, in a case named Representation 
6.963, have so requested:  
 
On merit, if by chance surpassed the formal order 
obstacles that our opinion has put in sight, is 
worth noting that the institution of party loyalty 
constitutes restriction to the liberty to the 
mandate’s exercise, almost would say a twin 
brother of the imperative prescript mandate, that 
the legislation of cultured people that has long 
left us, backed up the modern concepts of 
                                                             
28 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. 
BRAZIL. Superior Electoral Court. Representation nº 
6.963. Rapporteur: Min. Décio Meirelles De Miranda. 




nServer=TSE&grupoTotalizacao=2> Acesso em: 17 de 
junho de 2017. 
From the original: No mérito, se acaso ultrapassados os 
obstáculos de ordem formal que nosso parecer pôs em 
relevo, vale ressaltar que o instituto da fidelidade partidária 
constitui restrição à liberdade do exercício do mandato, 
quase diria um irmão gêmeo do proscrito mandato 
imperativo, que a legislação dos povos cultos de há muito 
political representation that Public Law and 
Political Science has provided us.  
The exception, then, to the general rule during 
the mandate’s exercise, is that the duty of party 
loyalty must be interpreted strictly according to 
the lesson that has being taught in all 
hermeneutical judicial manuals.29 
 
The parquet, during the Civil Military 
Dictatorship, was already positioned to protect the 
mandates conquered through the popular vote – 
maximum democracy’s exercise – from the 
moorings put by the party loyalty, whereas this, 
even though if coated with legality, didn’t restrain 
the parliamentarian’s own rights.  
   
4 THE IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 
 
The impeachment process finds 
prediction in the BFC/88 under the nomenclature 
of position loss, which the infraconstitutional 
regulation is stipulated by the Law 1.079/5030. We 
do not aim here to diminish the concatenation of 
all the impeachment process, doing only a general 
summary on it, to get to the subject of study itself. 
First of all, we must stress that any 
citizen has the power of lodging a complaint 
against the Chief of Executive for responsibility 
crime, fundamentally and with the suitable proof 
(or statement that it cannot be made), to the 
President of the Chamber of Deputies31, who may 
or may not accept it. 
abandonou, respaldada nos modernos conceitos de 
representação política que nos ministram o Direito Público 
e a Ciência Política. 
Exceção, que é, assim, à regra geral da liberdade no 
exercício do mandato, o dever da fidelidade partidária há de 
ser interpretado restritivamente, consoante lição que se 
aprende em todos os manuais de hermenêutica jurídica. 
30 BRAZIL. Law No. 1,079 of April 10, 1950. Defines the 
crimes of responsibility and regulates the respective process 
of judgment. Official diary. Brasília, April 12, 1950. 
Disponível em: 
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L1079.htm. 
Acesso em: 19/05/2017>. 
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In case the President of the Chamber 
accepts the pressed charge, it starts effectively the 
impeachment process with the formation of a 
Commission specially designed to that 
deliberation, which will elaborate an opinion 
(exercising the contradictory and broad defense 
right by the denounced) about the precedency or 
not of that accusation. 
The opinion issued by the Special 
Commission will then be submitted to the opinion 
of the Plenary of the Chamber, which, through 
nominal vote, will have a say on the agreement 
about the opinion showed. In case there is a voting 
to the acceptance of the complaint (uncommitted 
to the fact that this opinion will come along or not 
with the charge) for at least 2/3 of totality of 
Deputies, the accusation will be adjudged by the 
Chamber of Deputies. In case there isn’t this 
qualified quorum, the process should be archived.  
After the decree of the accusation, it goes 
to the judgement phase itself. This phase occurs at 
the Brazilian Federal Senate32, being the House 
held by the President of the Federal Supreme 
Court, in a truthful exercise of the system of 
checks and balances, in which all the powers find 
themselves closed in the same room – the 
Executive being judged, the Judiciary presiding 
the judgement and the Legislative being the judge 
that will determine the existence or not of a crime. 
In that manner, at the Federal Senate, 
there will be again the designation of a 
commission that will elaborate the accusatory 
libelo and, after instauration of the process in the 
referred House, the Chief of Executive will be 
suspended of his functions by the maximum term 
of 180 days. In case there should not be a 
conclusion on the process on the Senate after the 
mentioned days, the President of the Republic will 
retake his position and resume his mandate.  
During all process is assured the exercise 
of the right of broad defense and contradictory by 
the denounced. In the end of debates, the 
                                                             
32 Senado Federal. 
President of the Federal Supreme Court33 must 
elaborate a report with a summary of the 
accusation, of the proofs of defense and 
accusation, submitting it finally to the nominal 
voting of Senators, whom shall give an opinion 
whether the responsibility crime has been 
committed or not by the Chief of Executive.  
Having a poll of 2/3 of Senators on the 
agreement that there was a responsibility crime, 
there will be the dismissal of the Chief of 
Executive of his position and (after the 
Constitution, Article 52, single paragraph) his 
disabling to the exercise of any public function for 
the next 08 years (what haven’t happened in 
Dilma Roussef’s process, once the Trial of the 
responsibility crime and the dismissal have been 
dismantled, as having the first being condemned 
and the second absolved). 
This brief summary only brings a 
superficial notion of the form through which the 
process of impeachment occurs, remembering 
that we do not aim to stretch ourselves upon it, nor 
analyze the Law 1.079/50 – in which there are 
several gaps. The core of the present study is to 
show that parliamentarians, in the referred 
request, analyze the proofs of the impeachment 
process, they listen and evaluate their arguments 
– brought by the witnesses of defense and 
accusation - and, by formulating ways of 
convincing the Jury, they decide by the existence 
or not of the responsibility crime. 
During the impeachment process the 
parliamentarian doesn’t legislate, doesn’t create 
anything that will be going to be integrated to the 
judicial order. He judges, exercising his atypical 
role in the power division, going forward upon the 
Judiciary wearing his coat and becoming judge of 
the case, a judge of a wide collegiate organ that 
will decide on the commitment or non-
commitment of a responsibility crime when the 
suspect is the Chief of Executive. 
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The behavior of the members of the Jury 
Court 34  works in a very similar. The jury is 
foreseen in the Federal Constitution and works in 
the trials of intentional crimes against life. In this 
trial, ordinary people form a popular collegiate – 
the jurors. These jurors do not necessarily have 
legal training and it is they who claim, after 
appreciating the evidences (of prosecution and 
defense) of the suit, whether the crime has 
occurred and whether the defendant is guilty or 
not guilty. In these cases, the magistrate only 
validates the popular will, setting the penalty, in 
case of conviction.  
Similarly, during the impeachment 
process the same principle is exerted, as the pairs 
of the Chief of Executive are politicians like 
himself. They then apprize the presented proof, 
with warrantee of contradictory and broad defense 
right, and they vote by the existence or not of the 
crime. 
In both cases, there won’t be a 
graduation in Law needed, not even judicial 
knowledge for them to be embedded in the 
function of juries of the set issue. The 
parliamentarian is nothing more than a jury and, 
as such, shouldn’t suffer any external influence, 
any previous determination of how to vote, once 
the principle of free convincing should be applied 
to the non-career jury themselves. 
It would be an absurd; a composition of 
a jury that already had the determination, 
beforehand, of what decision should be made.  
Likewise, it puts the “fixation of matter” in the 
impeachment process. Well, how can a judge/jury 
go to the pre-trial and trial phases of a process 
already with a decided vote?  
 
5 THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE 
“FIXATION OF MATTER” IN THE 
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 
 
                                                             
34 Tribunal do Júri. 
After analyzing the institutions of the 
party loyalty and of the “fixation of matter”, as 
well as the operation of the impeachment process, 
we will reach the key point of our study: the 
inapplicability of punishment by party betrayal, to 
the parliamentarian that votes against the 
“fixation of matter” of a political party, in the case 
of the judgement of the impeachment process. 
That is because, in the case of voting in 
the impeachment process (may it be for the 
denunciation decree – by the Chamber of 
Deputies – or by the commitment or not of a crime 
– by the Federal Senate), the parliamentarian stop 
exercising its typical legislative function, starting 
to exercise his atypical function as a judge. 
That fact coordinates with the ways of 
how powering control consubstantiated in the 
checks and balances system and, in that way, it 
would be completely contradictory from that of 
having to judge, being obliged to follow a 
previously imposed positioning from whoever it 
is, what would turn all the process of appreciation 
of proof into a mere theater, once the 
parliamentarians couldn’t use its free convincing 
act in the judgment. 
In so being, we understand that as the 
parliamentarian is to exercise his function of 
judge, there is no space to establishing a party 
guideline, or even making it capable of leading to 
the expulsion for party betrayal, since the political 
field agency does not relies clearly in the party’s 
exercise of influence, while it is judging the Chief 
of Executive for the responsibility crime, as a 
maximal instance of popular representation.  
The liberty of conviction is intrinsic to 
the judging activity and, in practice, in the 
moment of the judgment of the Chief of Executive 
by the responsibility crime, the parliamentarian 
converts himself into Tribunal, exercising the 
judicial function. 
The 5th Article of the BFC/88 that rules 
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determines us some dispositions that, warranted 
for the common citizen, cannot be taken of any 
person, especially from the Chief of Executive, as 
in trial. We can think as an example the 5th Article, 
subsections XXXVII, LIII, LIV, LV, from 
Brazilian Magna Carta. 
In that way, in case of admission of the 
“fixation of matter”, with pronouncing of a party 
guideline in the cases of judgement of an 
impeachment process, obviously, it would cease 
the existing judgement in the determined terms by 
the BFC/88 and the procedure disposed by Law 
1.079/50 35 , happening to exist an exception 
judgement, in which the party’ summits would 
substitute the jury foreseen in the Magna Carta 
(provided with power that flows from the people 
to political representation) and that, even before 
the analysis of the proofs and reports of the 
process, would determine the way of judging, 
offending, clearly, to the proper legal process, to 
the contradictory and broad defense right of the 
Chief of Executive. 
As an example, that would be as if the 
National Council of Justice36 , previously to the 
judgement of any case, obliged, under penalty of 
punishment, that certain Appellate Judge37 of a 
Court to vote in a predetermined way, even before 
the proof analysis from the case-file 38  and 
presentation of defense.  
As previously elucidated, the “fixation of 
matter” should occur only to the defense of the 
political party basis, and clearly the positioning of 
the parliamentarian in the impeachment process 
could never have been included as a constant 
matter in the party program, in the pragmatic 
norms or statutory in any political partisan 
association. 
                                                             
35 Cf footnote nº 17. 
36 Conselho Nacional de Justiça. 
37  In Brazilian Portuguese, Desembargadores. As the 
political and judicial regimes in Brazil work differently as 
in other countries, we decided by this translation, which 
brings an idea of what it is about. 
The “fixation of matter” wouldn’t be, 
therefore, used as an instrument of coalition of the 
parliamentarian action in relation to the party 
doctrine, but as a halter of the partisan leadership 
to the exercise of the (parlia)mentarian39 function 
of the elected mandataries, taking from them the 
essence of the existence of – the speech – in a 
clear objective deviation. 
In addition to that, the appreciation of 
occurrence or not of a responsibility crime is a 
debatable matter and, in having technical 
defenders with a good reputation in both sides, 
there is no possibility for the party to unify the 
understanding of its members, once they would be 
removing their ability to judge, to self-
determination, offending the imperative of 
consciousness and personal political conviction 
and, ultima ratio, the representative power of a 
part of the population. 
The parliamentarians are inviolable, 
during the mandate’s exercise, by their opinions, 
words and votes, and the possibility of exclusion 
of the party exactly by doing one of these 
prerogatives consists in a manifest antinomy. 
In that sense, in analyzing an analogous 
case (in state level), Clève stresses: 
 
[...] To comprehend as possible the definition of 
a party guideline in that Field, the judgement or 
decree of the offered accusation against the 
Governor would unhand the formation of the 
Tribunal’s competence, shaped by state deputies 
(for initiation of proceedings) and by deputies 
and Appellate Judges (for the Trial), being, 
before, held, as put by Miguel Reale, apropos of 
a party guideline binding to the parliamentarian 
members of the old Electoral College, through 
successive nexus, and against the fixation of 
matter for association, by the party leadership 
itself. The process, the contradictory and the 
broad defense right, wouldn’t be more than 
ornamental pieces removed from functionality. 
38 In Brazilian Portuguese, autos [do processo]. 
39 From the original: (parla)mentar. The parentheses seem 
to address to the etymology of the vocable, the latin word 
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May it be agreed that a similar interpretation is 
not compatible with the judging function, and 
that is the reason why the deputies can and should 
decide not in accordance with an eventual party 
guideline (that, in that matter, will always be 
null), but yes following the applicable law, to the 
constant proof of the pieces and the formed 
conviction.  
With this background, once more, it is concluded 
that the parliamentarians are immunized against 
the application of sanction for having abstained 
to vote as determined by the guideline, by the 
executive commission of the party. More than 
abstention, the parliamentarians could have 
voted against the accusation and not even this 
way they could, in exercising the judging 
function, be accused by practice of deviant 
conduct for betrayal of the party. 
[...] any punishment would be applicable to the 
parliamentarians by the simple fact that any 
guideline can reach them in the exercise of the 
judging function, under penalty of aggression to 
(i) conviction freedom, to the (ii) principle of 
natural judge (with the guideline, in a reflex or 
indirect way, who decide are the party leaders 
and not the Assembly, in the case of decree of 
accusation) and (iii) to the principle of due 
process (that implies impartial decision with 
sustenance of the applicable law and on the basis 
of the evidence produced in the course of 
process). 
As one can see, there is no ground for 
application, by the political party, of penalties to 
                                                             
40 CLÈVE, Clèmerson Merlin. Fidelidade Partidária e 
Impeachment – Estudo de Caso. 2. ed. Curitiba: Juruá 
Editora, 2012, p. 56, 59.  
From the original: [...] A compreender-se como possível a 
definição de diretriz partidária neste sítio, o julgamento ou 
a decretação da denúncia oferecida contra o Governador 
deixaria de constituir competência do tribunal formado 
pelos deputados estaduais (para a instauração do processo) 
e pelos deputados e desembargadores (para o julgamento), 
sendo, antes, exercida, como disse Miguel Reale a propósito 
de diretriz partidária vinculante do voto dos parlamentares 
integrantes do antigo Colégio Eleitoral, através de 
sucessivos elos, e diante do fechamento de questão pela 
agremiação, pela própria direção partidária. O processo, o 
contraditório, a ampla defesa, não passariam, na hipótese, 
de peças ornamentais despidas de funcionalidade. 
Concorde-se que semelhante interpretação não é compatível 
com a função de julgar, daí por que podem e devem os 
deputados decidir, não de acordo com eventual diretriz 
partidária (que, neste particular, será sempre nula), mas sim, 
conforme o direito aplicável, as provas constantes dos autos 
e a convicção formada. 
Com este fundamento, mais uma vez, conclui-se estarem os 
parlamentares imunizados contra a aplicação de sanção por 
the parliamentarian, in consequence of examined 
representation [...] 40 
 
For all that has been said, in our 
understanding it is impossible to measure – and to 
charge – the party (loyal)ty 41  during the 
impeachment process, that, for its peculiarities, 
escapes to the possibility of “fixation of matter”, 
consubstantiating itself in the practice of the 
judicial function by the parliamentarian in an 
atypical way, emptying the possibility of his 
punishment by the party, for not having followed 
the party commandment – “fixation of matter” – 




During the impeachment process we 
have the Chief of Executive being judged – in 
theory – by the responsibility crime. However, in 
this case, the trial takes place in the National 
Congress and not in some random Court. 
Similarly, the judges in this trial are the 
Parliamentarians and not Law Judges.   
terem se abstido de votar conforme determinado, em 
diretriz, pela comissão executiva do partido.Mais do que a 
abstenção, poderiam os parlamentares votar contra a 
acusação e nem assim poderiam, exercendo função de 
julgar, sofrer acusação de prática de conduta desviante por 
deslealdade ao partido.  
[...] nenhuma punição seria aplicável aos parlamentares pelo 
simples fato de que diretriz alguma pode alcançá-los no 
exercício da função de julgar, sob pena de agressão à (i) 
liberdade de convicção, ao (ii) princípio do juiz natural 
(com a diretriz, de modo reflexo ou indireto, quem decide 
são os dirigentes partidários e não a Assembléia, no caso de 
decretação da acusação) e (iii) ao princípio do devido 
processo legal (que implica decisão imparcial com 
sustentação no direito aplicável e a partir dos elementos 
probatórios produzidos no curso do processo). 
Como se vê, não há fundamento para a aplicação, pelo 
partido político, de penalidade aos parlamentares, em 
decorrência da representação examinada [...]. 
41 The parentheses highlight the etymology of the word, 
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This judgment occurs, yet, in the context 
of Brazilian Presidentialism, which conjugates 
the Federalist State, divided in 26 Member-states 
and a Federal District, and the proportional 
electoral open list system, in which the elections 
are national, even though its bases are regional. 
Adding these facts to the existence of a multi-
party system that turns the Congress into an 
extremely heterogeneous environment, as well as 
the fact that the directly elected (by the people) 
President hasn’t necessarily the support of the 
majority of Parliament, one meets the need of 
alliance formation between the Executive and the 
Legislative Powers. 
The elected President needs the 
Congress to rule and to approve the projects of its 
national development agenda, whilst the 
Parliamentarians aim mostly their regional 
development, so they have this positive plea in 
their reelection. All that being put, one can better 
understand the concept of the so called Coalition 
Presidentialism.  
Furthermore, in the context of coalition 
presidentialism, it has emerged the urgency (the 
call) for the formation of a support base in the 
Congress, which should be capable of approving 
the necessary agenda to the governability of the 
Executive. Nevertheless, in order for this base to 
be effectively solid and trustworthy, it is 
imperious that one creates a (better) tool to make 
the Parliamentarians loyal to the guidelines as put 
by their parties on the relevant questions to 
government (and equally, as a way of defying the 
opposition parties). 
This tool received the name of “Fixation 
of Matter” as the party, before any poll, 
deliberates about the theme to be debated on the 
Congress and determines – beforehand – the way 
in which its members should vote in their 
respective houses in the Parliament, under penalty 
of punishment (and expulsion). 
This method of party loyalty, however, 
should be faced carefully, under the risk of 
making a dictatorship out of the party or a “State 
from Parties” (Parteienstaat to the Germans or 
partitocrazia to Italians), with marionette-
Congressmen forming their parties. 
At the level of legal-political relations, 
the institute of “fixation of matter”, tool used to 
maintenance of the party loyalty, could never be 
used by political parties to determine the way of 
voting of its members during the impeachment 
process, once the discussed theme is not, in any 
case, about the founding bases and guidelines of a 
political party.  
On the contrary, if the parliamentarian – 
after appreciation of proofs of the process – 
understands that a responsibility crime occurred, 
and, even so, votes against the impeachment, then 
yes, there would be a denaturalization of the party 
bases, in which the majority brings principles 
such as honesty, ethics, morals, etc.  
Therefore, the “fixation of matter” 
cannot be used as an instrument of party loyalty 
during the impeachment process, because the tool 
here finds itself as a hammer aiming to screw a 
bolt, it is, that hasn’t been made to the referred 
goal, not meeting a given role with efficiency and 
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